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In response to the growing academic and political movement that opposes the direct
incorporation of treaties into domestic federal law, numerous scholars have proposed that states
take on an increased role in the domestic interpretation and implementation of intematonal
human rights treaties. The focus of this scholaiship to date has been to locate doctrinal gaps
where state legislatures and courts may act without intruding in aras of tra&tionally federal
jurisdiction. Thus far, however, little effort has been drected towards modeling an afirmative
obligation for state participation in treaty implementation, despite the fact that state action is
arguably required both pranatically and doctrinally, if the United States is to comply with its
commitments under international human rights law In this Artcle, Iargue that refraining twty
implementation through a dynamic federalist model could be productive and even necessaty if
the United States is going to meet its existing international obligations. As an example, I iscuss
the ongoing litigation over the United States'failure to honor its obligations under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). Federal actors have relied on federalism concerns
to avoid foreing states to remedy violations of Convention rights, thus leaving the question of
whether the United States will reach compliance entirely in the hands of the states, which have
generally been slow to take up the call Drawing on a model proposed by Justice Breyer, I
contend that adopting a dynamic federalist model to implement and enforee the VCCR could
help to move beyond this impasse, and pethaps more importantly, could help realize the benelfts
offederalism within the context ofhuman ights treaty implementation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Several recent United States Supreme Court decisions
incorporating international human rights law into constitutional
interpretation have provoked an outpouring of scholarship and popular
debate about the appropriate role of foreign and international law in
our courts and jurisprudence.' The battle lines in these debates are
drawn between the nationalists who "believe that treaties have
domestic effect superseding inconsistent domestic law ...
unconstrained by most constitutional limitations" and "revisionist
scholars [who] argue[] that treaties should be subject to strict political
and constitutional constraints, drastically limiting the effect that
treaties have within the domestic legal system."'2 This dispute has
significant consequences for domestic governance, because "the
subjects of these treaties have increasingly turned toward areas of law
that have been traditionally governed exclusively by domestic law.' '3
In no area, perhaps, is this dispute more meaningful than in
international human rights law. The major international human rights
treaties regulate fundamental aspects of the relationship between the
individual and the nation and impose affirmative obligations on the
signatory nations with respect to the treatment of their citizens. The
treaties address issues such as racial and gender equality, criminal
procedure and punishment, and religious freedom. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' for example, which has been
signed and ratified by nearly 100 nations, including the United States,
requires signatories to extend certain individual rights and protections
to all persons within their jurisdiction, regardless of whether other
signatories offer reciprocal recognition In sum, "There is now
general agreement 'that how a [nation] state treats individual human
beings, including its own citizens, in respect of their human rights, is
1. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (citing foreign law in the
course of holding that execution of juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 578 (2003) (citing foreign law in holding that the
criminalization of same-sex sodomy violates privacy interests protected by the Due Process
Clause); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (citing foreign law to hold that the
execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment).
2. Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties
and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 323 (2005).
3. Id. at 323-24.
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
5. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power andAmeican Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REv. 390,396-97 (1998).
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not the state's own business alone ... but is a matter of international
concern and a proper subject for regulation by international law."'
In the United States, many of the areas addressed by these treaties
have often, although not exclusively, been regulated by the states.
Thus, one of the primary concerns raised by the revisionists has been
one of federalism. More specifically, they argue that because
international human rights treaties often intersect with those areas of
law that have historically been reserved to the states, adopting them as
part of federal law will significantly infringe on state sovereignty and
state norms.
A certain conventional wisdom has taken hold, which sees some
significant tension between international law and institutions on the one
hand, and the demands of U.S. federalism on the other. In [the
revisionist] account, international law at least stifles, if it does not
silence, domestic voices beyond those of a narrow set of national actors
responsible for the foreign affairs of the United States.!
One response to the revisionists has been to suggest a greater role
for the states in international treaty development and interpretation.9
Since the 1980s, commentators have suggested that state courts take
up the lead in using international human rights standards to inform
state constitutional interpretation, pushing state protections beyond
those provided by the United States Constitution."0 This is not an
6. Id.
7. See generaly Bradley, supra note 5, at 401-09 (discussing the ways in which the
treaty power could be used to overcome federalism restraints in the areas of human rights,
criminal law and punishment, commerce and trade, and environmental protection).
8. Robert B. Ahdieh, Foreign Affairs, International Law, and the New Federalism:
Lessons from Coordination, 73 Mo. L. REv. 1185, 1205 (2008).
9. See generally Martha E Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and
International Human Rights, 30 N.YU. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359 (2006) (describing
methods by which state courts may implement international treaty obligations through state
constitutional construction).
10. In the late 1970s, Justice Brennan called upon states to interpret their own
constitutions more expansively than the federal Constitution with respect to the protection on
individual liberties. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Ind'vidual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977). Since then, numerous
commentators have encouraged state courts to rely on international human rights treaties as
persuasive authority in thinking about how these broader rights should be construed. See,
e.g., Elizabeth E Defeis, Univeisal Declaration of Human Rights: A Standard for States 28
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 259, 260 (2004); Robert Doughten, Filling Everyone Bowl: A Call To
Affirm a Positive Right to Minimum Welfare Guarantees and Shelter in State Constitutions
To Satisfy International Standards ofHuman Decency, 39 GONZ. L. Rev. 421, 437-42 (2003);
Alan Jenkins & Sabrineh Ardalan, Positive Health: The Human Right to Health Care Under
the New York State Constitution, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 479, 514-15 (2008); Bert Lockwood
Jr., R. Collins Owens III & Grace A. Severyn, Litgating State Constitutional Rights to
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entirely new idea. State courts have historically shared the
responsibility for interpreting and applying international law." They
have also been seen as a possible site for other legal innovation,
including the development of greater constitutional protections and
other progressive reforms."
This increased focus on states as a possible site for
experimentation and innovation is not unique to the context of
international human rights law. In the past few years, as certain states
have demonstrated more openness than the federal government to
opportunities for progressive reform, numerous scholars have
proposed new models of state-federal interaction that are designed to
take advantage of the possibilities of jurisdictional redundancy and
dialogue. Variously called "interactive,"13 "dialogic,"' or "poly-
phonic"'" federalism,'6 these models focus less on divvying up areas of
jurisdictional authority and more on the "protection of the institutional
integrity of multiple sources of power and the promotion of the
dynamic interaction of those centers of authority.' These models
have been applied to a variety of contexts, from education,'8 to
environmental protection, 9 to corporate law.2
Happiness and Safety. A Strategy for Ensuring the Provision of Basic Needs to the Poor, 2
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 19-24 (1993).
11. See Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How the States Control
Compliance with InternationalLaw, 82 N.C. L. REv. 457, 531-32 (2004).
12. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions: A National Perspective, 3
WIDENER J. PuB. L. 7, 24 (1993); Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of
Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 896-99 (1989).
13. See generally Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91
IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005).
14. Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism; Constitutional Possibilities for
Incorporation ofHuman Rights Law in the United States, 150 U PA. L. REv. 245, 250 (2001).
15. See generally Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in
the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. RE. 1409 (1999).
16. 1 will adopt Kirsten Engel's practice of referring to this collection of theories as
models of "dynamic federalism." See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynanic
Federalism in En vironmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006).
17. Schapiro, supra note 13, at 285.
18. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (quoting Little Rock Sch.
Dist. v. Mauney, 183 E3d 816, 830 (8th Cir. 1999) for the proposition that the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act presents a model of "cooperative federalism"). See generally
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a Federal
Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 1653 (2007).
19. See generally Engel, supra note 16; William W Buzbee, Contextual
EnvironmentalFederalism, 14 NYU. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005).
20. See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federal Rules to Intersystemic
Governance in Securities RegulatioA 57 EMORy LJ. 233 (2007).
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Recently, scholars have begun to think about the role of dynamic
federalism in foreign affairs and international human rights law.
Catherine Powell has argued for a model of "dialogic federalism" in
the adoption of international human rights law." She points to efforts
by state and local governments to adopt international human rights
standards even where the federal government has failed to sign or
ratify that treaty and to supplement measures taken by the federal
government to comply with ratified treaties.22 Judith Resnik has
critiqued the growth of foreign affairs preemption rules that seek to
limit these kinds of local initiatives.23 Resnik argues that "[b]efore
finding that national action is the exclusive means of interacting with
'the foreign,' judges ought to require specific national legislative
directives as well as the presentation of detailed factual information
about how concurrent or overlapping rules (federal and state) do harm
national interests. 2"
To date, this scholarly attention has generally been focused on
identifying jurisprudential gaps for state innovation. In essence, the
goal has been to locate spaces where state involvement with foreign
affairs or with the adoption of treaty-based norms is not preempted.
However, little effort has been directed thus far towards modeling an
affirmative obligation for state participation in treaty implementa-
tion-notwithstanding that state action is arguably required, both
pragmatically and doctrinally, if the United States is to comply with its
international human rights treaty obligations. The absence of this
discussion in the scholarship represents a missed opportunity, given
that these treaties epitomize the tensions in the dualist model. In this
Article, I begin to set out my argument that refriaming treaty
implementation through a dynamic federalist model could be
productive and even necessary, if the United States is going to meet its
existing international obligations. I use as an example the United
21. Powell, supia note 14, at 250-52.
22. Significantly, Powell notes that she is unaware of any efforts involving her third
track of dialogic federalism, which involves "state and local efforts to apply [international]
human rights principles contained in treaty provisions for which the United States has entered
a reservation." Id. at 274. It is this possibility that I will take up in more detail in my final
part.
23. See Judith Resnik, The Internationalism ofAmeican Federalism: Missouri and
Hollanc4 73 Mo. L. REv. 1105, 1142-43 (2008); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.YU. L.
REv. 1, 67-68 (2007).
24. Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Hoizontal Federalism
and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31,
41-42 (2007).
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States' experience with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR).2'
In Part H, I begin with a brief discussion of the current barriers to
human rights treaty implementation in the United States. For decades,
a heated debate has raged in the scholarly literature as to what extent
the federal government may rely upon the treaty power to legislate in
areas otherwise reserved to the states. In recent decades, these
academic disputes have translated into a growing political movement
that seeks to protect the structure of US. federalism from treaty-based
federal incursions. As a doctrinal matter, federalism constraints do not
currently place significant limits on the treaty power, but the strength
of the political opposition has changed the way federal actors seek to
exercise this authority, creating de facto boundaries.
As an example, I explain how this political movement has played
out in the context of the United States' obligations under the VCCR.
Despite the strong likelihood that the VCCR is a constitutional
exercise of the treaty power as currently defined, federal actors have
relied on principles of federalism to avoid requiring states to remedy
violations of VCCR rights. As a result, the executive now lacks the
authority to remedy VCCR violations, and thus the ability of the
United States to meet its international obligations is determined by the
actions of the states, many of which have failed to take the affirmative
steps necessary to ensure that VCCR rights are honored and that
violations are remedied. Congressional action could force state
participation in VCCR implementation, but federalism concerns mean
that Congress is unlikely to legislate so deeply and specifically in areas
of state control.
In Part III, I propose that applying a dynamic federalist model to
VCCR implementation could provide the beginning of a path through
the impasse. Given that the VCCR remains binding on the United
States, and that the federal government is unlikely or unable to take
actions that intrude deeply into areas of state jurisdiction to enforce it,
the states must take an affirmative role in implementation if the United
States is to meet its obligations. Because enforcement of the VCCR
crosses traditional notions of state and federal jurisdictional
boundaries, a model of treaty implementation that provides the states
with a primary role in interpretation and enforcement could very well
be the way that the United States can most effectively meet its VCCR
25. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
1030 [Vol. 84:1025
2010] HUMANR[GHTS TREA TYIMPLEMENTA TION 1031
obligations, while acknowledging some state authority and autonomy
in the area of criminal justice. I draw on Justice Breyer's dissent in a
recent VCCR case, Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon,26 and some of the
federalism scholarship on "ceilings" and "floors" in other areas of the
law to explain how this model could work. I argue that this less
invasive strategy could be both normatively beneficial and more
politically feasible to federal and state actors, and could lead to more
effective internalization and implementation of the United States'
international human rights commitments.
Finally, in Part I, I extend this model to other international
human rights treaties. Due to the way in which many of these treaties
have been adopted, states arguably have the primary obligation to
interpret and implement them. Nonetheless, most have failed to take
up the mantle of enforcement. I contend that a dynamic federalist
model of treaty implementation could help motivate state involvement
and legitimate the resulting activity.
II. PARALYSIS IN TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
In recent years, the academic debate over the implementation of
international human rights treaties has heightened, prompted by the
revival of federalism in other contexts." The debate has focused in
large part on the extent of that treaty power as expressed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v Holland" In Holland Justice
Holmes rejected Missouri's position that the treaty power is subject to
the same constitutional constraints as Congress's domestic authority,
26. 548 U.S. 331, 365-98 (2006).
27. This is not to say, however, that this debate is entirely new. "A long line of critics,
starting with Thomas Jefferson, have advocated sharp limits on the use of the treaty power out
of a belief that automatically incorporating treaty law into domestic law via the Supremacy
Clause is inconsistent with the Constitution's general scheme for a federal government of
limited powers." Laura Moranchek Hussain, Note, Enforcing the Treaty Rights of Aliens,
117 YALE L.J. 680, 683 (2008) (citing Thomas Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice
for the Use of the Senate of the United States, in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS
353, 420-21 (Wilbur Samuel Howell ed., 1988)). Jefferson wrote:
To what subjects this [treaty] power extends, has not been defined in detail by the
constitution; nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves.... It must have meant
to except out of these the rights reserved to the states; for surely the President and
Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from doing in
any way ... And also to except those subjects of legislation in which it gave a
participation to the House of Representatives. This last exception is denied by
some, on the ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty power to
work on. The less the better, say others.
Jefferson, supra, at 420-21.
28. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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noting that the treaty power is enumerated and the Tenth Amendment
reserves to those states only those powers not given to the federal
government by the Constitution.29 Justice Holmes did acknowledge
that the treaty power is not unlimited, but concluded that because the
treaty in question "[did] not contravene any prohibitory words to be
found in the Constitution,"" the only question remaining was whether
the treaty's provisions were "forbidden by some invisible radiation
from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."3
The nationalist view of Holland is that the case stands for the
powerful proposition that the treaty power was fully delegated by the
founders to the federal government." This view has survived for
decades, has been affirmed in subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court," and has provided the basis for lower federal court decisions
upholding legislation that implements U.S. obligations under the
Hostage-Taking Convention.' Moreover, political attempts to overturn
this holding directly have been unsuccessful. The most significant
attempt occurred in the 1950s when Senator Bricker of Ohio pushed
for a constitutional amendment to overrule Holland The Bricker
Amendment, as it was called, would have provided that "[a] treaty shall
become effective as internal law in the United States only through ...
appropriate legislation," which would be valid in the absence of a
29. Id. at 432.
30. Id. at 433.
31. Id. at 433-34.
32. Louis Henkin has said that as a result:
[W]hatever is within its scope is not reserved to the states: the Tenth Amendment
is not material. Many matters, then, may appear to be 'reserved to the States' as
regards domestic legislation if Congress does not have power to regulate them; but
they are not reserved to the states so as to exclude their regulation by international
agreement.
Louis HENKiN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 191 (2d ed. 1996).
33. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) ("There is nothing in State of
Missouri v. Holland which is contrary to the position taken here.... To the extent that the
United States can validly make treaties, the people and the States have delegated their power
to the National Government and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier." (citations omitted));
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("The treaty-making power of the United
States is not limited by any express provision of the Constitution, and, though it does not
extend 'so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,' it does extend to all proper
subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations." (quoting Geofroy v.
Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1027-28 (11th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Lue, 134 E3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 1998). A treaty shall become effective as
internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence
of treaty. Id. at 84-85.
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treaty." Despite repeated attempts, the Bricker Amendment was
defeated, although the margin was only one vote in its last
incarnation. 6
Despite the continuing precedential validity of the Holland
doctrine, however, it has come under increasing scholarly attack in
recent decades. In the 1990s, emboldened by the Supreme Court's
"New Federalism" cases,37 revisionist scholars like Curtis Bradley
began to argue that Holland should be overruled.38  The revisionists
pointed to the ever-expanding scope of Congress's use of the treaty
power, as evidenced primarily by the human rights treaties, and argued
that the limitations the Court has placed both on the subject matter and
the structure of Congress's legislative ability domestically should be
translated into the treaty context to prevent Congress from using the
treaty power to circumvent its domestic limitations.39
Although thus far unsuccessful in changing the doctrine, these
academic arguments have taken hold politically. Despite the failure of
the Bricker Amendment as a formal matter, many have argued that its
35. 99 CONG. REc. 6777 (1953).
36. Moreover, its proponents were mollified with an agreement from the Eisenhower
administration that the United States would not sign the international human rights
conventions that were being proposed. See Louis Henkin, US. Ratification ofHuman Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bncker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 348-49 (1995).
37. Much ink has been spilled in analyzing the "New Federalism" cases. See, e.g.,
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levison, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1045, 1052-53 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L.
RE. 7, 7-8 (2001); Thomas W Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court. A
PrelinnaryAnalysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 618-19 (2003). These cases began with the
Rehnquist Court's 1995 decision in United States v Lopez 514 U.S. 549 (1995), limiting
congressional authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause, which was extended in its
decision in United States v Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In these cases, the Court
emphasized the need to define limitations on the authority of the federal government by
drawing a distinction between "what is truly national and what is truly local." Morison, 529
U.S. at 608. Reinforcing this apparent tend toward limiting federal power and protecting
areas of state autonomy, the Court subsequently decided several other significant cases
"restricting Congress's power to regulate state government officials, Congress's power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, and Congress's power to legislate pursuant to its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power." David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges,
Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IowA L. RE. 41, 46 (2006).
As Robert Ahdieh has noted, "[N]o great consistency has been evident in the renewed
embrace of federalism?' Ahdieh, supra note 8, at 1191. The Court's decision in Gonzales v
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), for example, caused commentators to wonder whether an end had
come to the federalism revolution. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a
Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 507, 508 (2006). Nonetheless,
"The broad trajectory of the last twenty years, however, is fairly clear. The federalism
revolution has continued its onward march." Ahdieh, supra note 8, at 1992.
38. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 5, at 460; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing
the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1868 (2005).
39. Bradley, supra note 5, at 456.
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"ghost" lives on.4" Since the 1980s, the Senate has adopted the practice
of attaching reservations, declarations, and understandings when
ratifying human rights treaties in order to cabin their impact.4' The
Senate has also refused to ratify signed international human rights
treaties in response to domestic political pressure.42  Further, "[T]he
judiciary has shown an increasing reluctance to allow treaties to be
enforced in court as part of domestic law, often declaring treaties to be
non-self-executing ... even when the Senate did not express a
reservation against its enforcement." '  Thus, despite the continuing
precedential validity of Holland, federal actors have expressed their
unwillingness to rely on it in numerous ways, imposing de facto
federalism boundaries on the treaty power. These boundaries have
prevented the United States from reaching compliance with its treaty
obligations.
The VCCR litigation history demonstrates how federal actors'
evolving views of the treaty power have been shaped by the federalism
debate. Article 36 of the VCCR requires that a foreign national be
notified at the time of his arrest that he has the right to request that the
consular officials of his home country be notified of his detention or
arrest." The United States signed the VCCR with a view towards
affording these rights to foreign nationals caught up in the criminal
justice system while on U.S. soil and securing these rights for
American nationals traveling abroad. 5 The United States also adopted
40. HENKIN, supm note 32, at 193 n.** (suggesting that "Senator Bricker lost the
constitutional battle but perhaps not his political war," given U.S. treaty practices thereafter);
Bradley, supra note 5, at 426-29 (noting that the Bricker Amendment controversy was
resolved in part because the federal government exercised self-restraint in imposing burdens
on the states).
41. Hussain, supra note 27, at 684-85 ("These reservations have been used to define
treaty-based rights as equivalent to already existing constitutional and statutory rights, to
block domestic enforcement of treaty rights by courts, and to preserve the same federal-state
allocation of implementation authority that exists for statutory legislation.").
42. For example, President Jimmy Carter signed CEDAW for the United States in
1980. See 126 CONG. REc. 29, 358 (1980) (recording the signing on July 17, 1980).
However, the treaty has not yet been ratified. "Opposition in the United States has been
couched in the language of jurisdiction and sovereignty." Resnik, supra note 23, at 1110.
Similar concerns about "American 'exceptionalism' and ... sovereignty blocked Senate
ratification after President Jimmy Carter signed the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rghts.' Robert S. Lawrence et al., "The First Wealth Is Health" The
Nexus ofHealth, Poverty, and the Law, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POY 583,587 (2008).
43. Hussain, supra note 27, at 685.
44. VCCR, supra note 25, art. 36.
45. "Article 36 was specifically cited as an essential tool for effective protection of
U.S. citizens abroad, one which served as a deterrent (though by no means a perfect one)
against abuse in countries with little to no protection from abuse within their criminal justice
systems." Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration
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the Optional Protocol to the VCCR, submitting itself to the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for all disputes among treaty
parties arising out of the VCCR provisions."
While the VCCR clearly touches on matters of U.S. foreign
policy, a somewhat ill-defined area in which federal predominance is
generally undisputed, the rights guaranteed by the VCCR must be
administered within the context of the criminal justice system, an area
traditionally reserved to the states. 7 Thus, because the VCCR
guarantees foreign nationals protections at the time of arrest, and
because most arrests occur under state authority, implementing and
enforcing the VCCR-as well as remedying any violations---often
must occur at the state level, at least in the first instance.
Although the constitutionality of article 36 as an exercise of the
treaty power has never been challenged, it is almost certainly valid
under the Holland doctrine. Holland suggests that a treaty that does
not contravene any prohibitory words of the Constitution will be valid
as long as it does not conflict with any "invisible radiation"
surrounding the Tenth Amendment.48 The holding indicates that the
scope of this invisible radiation must be tested in light of the national
interest at stake.4" The Court has repeatedly recognized that providing
standards for the reciprocal treatment of nationals abroad is a core
national interest.0 In this way, the VCCR is quite similar to other
treaties that courts have previously found to be valid.' Thus, under
oflnternational Human Rghts, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 755, 791 (2006) (citing US. Ciiizens
Imprisoned in Mexico. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International, Political, and
MlitaryAffais, 94th Cong. pt. 2, at 6 (1975) (statement of Leonard E Walentynowicz, U.S.
Dep't of State)).
46. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Apr. 24, 1963), 27 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
47. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist papers, "the ordinary
administration of criminal and civil justice" belongs to the states. THE FEDERALIST No. 17
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
48. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433-34 (1920).
49. Id at 435.
50. See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) ("Treaties for the
protection of citizens of one country residing in the territory of another are numerous, and
make for good understanding between nations.").
51. See id. at 340-41 (referring to a reciprocal rights treaty with Japan guaranteeing
citizens abroad certain enumerated rights); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890)
(referring to a treaty addressing inheritance rights); United States v. Lue, 134 E3d 79, 83-84
(2d Cir. 1998) (referring to a treaty requiring criminal penalties for foreign nationals
convicted of hostage-taking activities).
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Hollana4 VCCR's article 36 is likely an acceptable exercise of the
treaty power.1
2
However, under the revisionists' view of the treaty power, the
VCCR would be subject to both subject matter and structural
challenges. With respect to subject matter, the question is whether
Congress's domestic constitutional authority could extend to requiring
states to comply with the VCCR's notification requirement and
ordering state courts to provide a remedy for any violation. This is a
tricky question given that it brings the well-established federal
authority over immigration and foreign affairs into direct conflict with
the states' "primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law."" Perhaps an even more significant hurdle would be a challenge
to the notification requirement under the anticommandeering doctrine.
Commentators are conflicted as to whether the notification provision
of the VCCR would survive.
My purpose here is not to resolve this hypothetical, but rather to
suggest that this ambivalence surrounding the VCCR-and the
validity of treaty claims more generally-has translated into
unwillingness by federal actors to take action to enforce its mandates,
rather than a problem of constitutional interpretation. A review of the
history of the article 36 litigation reveals that, through adopting a
series of self-imposed limitations, federal actors have stymied their
own implementation authority and ensured that without state
participation, the United States will continue to violate its VCCR
obligations.
A. Breard andLaGrand
Despite the important role the states play in administering article
36, little was done after the ratification of the VCCR to inform them of
52. But see Molora Vadnais, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument Against Judicial
Involvement in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 47 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 307, 326 (1999).
53. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
54. Compare Cyril Robert Emery, Treaty Solutions from the Land Down Under.-
ReconcilingAmeican Federalism and International Law, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 115, 133-
34 (2005) (suggesting that application of the anticommandeering doctrine to the treaty power
could prevent implementation of the VCCR), with Joshua A. Brook, Federalism and Foreign
Affairs: How To Remedy Violations of the Vienna Convention and Obey the US
Constitution, Too, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 573, 592-94 (2004) (arguing that anticom-
mandeering doctrine should not apply to treaties or their implementing legislation).
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their treaty obligations." "State and local police forces thus operated
in blissful ignorance of the requirement, with the result that
noncompliance was widespread' 6 The United States' ongoing failure
to ensure that foreign nationals received their treaty rights began to be
challenged in state, federal, and international courts, as other States
parties protested the imposition of the death penalty on their citizens
who had been denied their treaty rights while in U.S. custody. 7 For the
most part, however, the federal government has taken the position that
it lacks the authority to compel the states to offer any kind of remedy
for their violations of the VCCR, and thus has sent the message that
compliance with the treaty is optional. 8
This pattern of federal deference to the states' authority over their
own criminal prosecutions was set early on in the VCCR litigation.
The first case to reach the Supreme Court was that of Angel Francesco
Breard, a Paraguayan citizen, who had been sentenced to death in
Virginia state courts for attempted rape and murder. 9 His petition for a
writ of habeas corpus argued that the Virginia authorities had violated
his rights under the VCCR by failing to inform him of his right to have
the Paraguayan Consulate notified of his arrest.' Both the federal
district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit refused to hear his claim based on the state law of procedural
default-that is, the courts determined that because Breard had failed
to raise his claim at trial, he had forfeited his right to raise it through
habeas review.6' Paraguay then filed its own case against Virginia
seeking to vacate Breard's conviction, which was promptly dismissed
on sovereign immunity grounds."
The executive was little more responsive to Paraguay's concerns
than the federal courts. While Paraguay's case against Virginia was
55. In fact, at the time of its adoption, "Congress did not pass any legislation ...
requiring federal law enforcement agents to follow Article 36." McGuinness, supm note 45,
at 795.
56. Id. at 796.
57. Id. at 796-98, 840-42.
58. There is an important exception to this general pattern, a memorandum issued by
President George W Bush to the Attorney General instructing state courts to review and
reconsider cases involving alleged violations of the VCCR fights of Mexican citizens. See
discussion infi-a Part H.B.
59. Jonathan I. Charney & W Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard, 92 Am. J. INr'L L.
666,666-67 (1998).
60. Id
61. Breard v. Netherland, 949 E Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1996), affb 134 E3d
615 (4th Cir. 1998).
62. Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 E Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (E.D. Va. 1996), affI4
134 E3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
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pending, the State Department issued a formal apology to Paraguay for
what it acknowledged was a breach of the VCCR, but still took the
position that the VCCR created no individually enforceable rights that
foreign nationals could enforce in U.S. courts.63 Moreover, when
Paraguay sought relief from the ICJ, the executive effectively
disregarded the resulting order that the United States prevent Breard's
execution while Paraguay's case against the United States before the
ICJ was pending.' Solicitor General Seth Waxman filed a brief in the
U.S. Supreme Court adopting the position that the United States was
not bound by the ICJ's order and arguing for a denial of the stay."
Although Secretary of State Madeleine Albright sent a letter to
Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore asking him to stay the execution out of
principles of comity,66 she noted that the United States' position was to
support the State and that the ICJ's order was "nonbinding."'7
The Supreme Court ultimately denied the stay of execution and
the request for relief." The Court acknowledged that as a treaty
ratified by the United States, the VCCR is the "supreme law of the
land," but held that the State's procedural default rule barred Breard
from raising this claim.69 The Court explained that the VCCR
expressly contemplates that it "shall be exercised in conformity with
the laws and regulations of the receiving State," and thus found that the
VCCR did not displace a basic rule of state criminal procedure.
Ignoring Secretary Albright's request, the State of Virginia executed
63. See William J. Aceves, International Decision: Case Concerning the Vienna
Conventon on Consular Relations, 93 AM. J. INT'LL. 924,927-28 (1999).
64. Frustrated by its treatment in U.S. courts, Paraguay had filed a complaint and an
application for the indication of provisional measures in the ICJ. The complaint alleged that
the United States had violated article 36 and should not be permitted to use the procedural
default doctrine to bar review of a VCCR claim. Paraguay requested that Breard's conviction
be vacated. See Application of the Republic of Paraguay, Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Apr. 3, 1998), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/99/7183.pdf.
65. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 49-5 1, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S.
371 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390, 97-8214).
66. Letter from Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Sec'y of State, to James S. Gilmore I1,
Governor of Va. (Apr. 13, 1998).
67. See Chamey & Reisman, supra note 59, at 667.
68. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 378-79 (per curiam).
69. Id. at 375-77.
70. Id. at 375-76 (quoting VCCR, supra note 25, art. 36(2)). The Court also noted
that the procedural default rule was adopted after the VCCR and thus displaced the VCCR
under the last in time principle. Id.
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Breard before the ICJ issued its decision on the merits." After the
execution, Paraguay withdrew its case.72
The Breardpattern was repeated in the cases of Karl and Walter
LaGrand, two German citizens who were sentenced to death in
Arizona." Both raised their VCCR claims for the first time on
collateral review. 4 After Karl was executed, Germany sued the United
States in the ICJ and separately requested a stay of Walter's execution
pending the ICJ's decision in the case." The ICJ issued a stay order,76
but again the Supreme Court refused to delay the execution." Walter
was executed before the ICJ's ruling, but unlike Paraguay, Germany
continued to litigate and ultimately prevailed before the ICJ, which
held that the United States had violated Germany's rights under the
VCCR.8 Further, the ICJ held the United States was obligated, in
cases of conviction and death sentence obtained in violation of the
VCCR, to "allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and
sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in
that Convention," notwithstanding any kind of state procedural bar.9
The Breardand LaGrandcases demonstrate what has become the
federal attitude towards state actors in VCCR enforcement. That is, the
executive branch has generally adopted a deferential posture towards
the states' VCCR enforcement efforts, limiting itself to educating state
and local officials as to what the VCCR entails and to encouraging the
states to comply with its mandates, while at the same time, taking the
position that the VCCR does not create judicially enforceable
individual rights, but rather must be invoked and protected through
diplomatic channels between VCCR parties." In both LaGrand and
71. Aceves, supra note 63, at 927.
72. See Scott W Lyons, Breach Without Remedy in the International Forum and the
Need for Self-Help: The Conundrum Resulting fom the Medellin Case, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 73, 78 (2009).
73. Aceves, supm note 63, at 924.
74. See Lyons, supra note 72, at 78.
75. LaGrand Case (Germ. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures of Protection Submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany of Mar. 2).
76. LaGrand Case (Germ. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Provisional Measures Order of Mar.
3).
77. SeeFederal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999).
78. LaGrand Case (Germ. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 516 (June 27).
79. Id.
80. Prior to Brear4 "[T]he [notification] requirement [was] not ... tak[en] very
seriously ... including not by the federal government. A periodic State Department notice
sent to the states' attorneys general was the federal government's only attempt to urge
compliance...." Elizabeth Samson, Revisiting Miranda After Avena: The Implications of
Mexico v. United States of America for the Implementation of the Vienna Convention on
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Brea, the executive's litigation position undermined its message to
the States that they have the obligation to enforce the VCCR's
provisions and provided the Supreme Court with a clear path to
denying petitioners' VCCR claims based on state law barriers."
B. Medellin andSanchez-Llamas
Despite these early losses in federal court, States parties to the
VCCR have continued to seek remedies for violations of VCCR rights
in the United States. Although the ICJ judgment came too late for the
LaGrand brothers, it was significant for Jos6 Ernesto Medellin, a
Mexican national who was sentenced to death in Texas." Medellin
raised his article 36 claim for the first time in his federal habeas corpus
petition, and while this case was pending, the Mexican government
initiated proceedings in the ICJ against the United States, alleging
violations of the VCCR in the case of Medellin and fifty-three other
Mexican nationals who had been sentenced to death in state criminal
proceedings. 3 On March 31, 2004, the ICJ issued its decision in
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United
States of Ameica)" The court found that the United States was in
breach of its VCCR obligations and ordered that US. courts give the
death row inmates effective "judicial review and reconsideration"
without applying procedural default rules to block defendants' claims."
Medellin's attorneys returned to U.S. courts to enforce the judgment of
ConsularRelationsin the United States; 29 FORDHAM INT'L LI. 1068, 1116(2006). After the
Breard and LaGrand cases, the executive branch did make a significant effort to inform state
and local officials about their obligations under the Convention. The State Department
launched a "broad educational program to inform local and state police, prosecutors, and
courts about the notification requirement." McGuinness, supra note 45, at 824. These efforts
did bring about some results. Some states "published their own guidelines on consular
notification to local police." Id.
81. McGuinness, supr note 45, at 824-25.
82. Id. at 755.
83. Mexico argued that the United States should be ordered to overturn the
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals whose proceedings occurred in violation
of the United States' international legal obligations. Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Avena), 2004 I.C.J. 128, at *20 (Judgment of Mar. 31, 2004).
Mexico further requested that the United States be ordered to take "steps necessary and
sufficient" to ensure that domestic law gave full effect "to the purposes for which the rights
afforded by Article 36 are intended" and "establish a meaningful remedy at law for violations
of the rights afforded to Mexico and its nationals by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention,"
including by removing any procedural bars for "failure timely [to] raise a claim or defence
based on the Vienna Convention' in any case where the United States breached its
notification obligations. Id. at *21-22.
84. Id
85. Id at *57.
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the ICJ but had no success in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the status of the ICJ judgment in U.S. courts."
However, before oral argument took place, a surprising
development occurred. President George W Bush issued a memoran-
dum to the Attorney General directing state courts to give effect to the
ICJ ruling in Avena and to review the cases of Medellin and the fifty
other Mexican foreign nationals on death row." The memorandum
stated "that the United States [would] discharge its inter-national
obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice"
and that it would do so "by having State courts give effect to the
decision in accordance with general principles of comity" 9
Simultaneously, however, the United States announced that it would be
withdrawing from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ over future
VCCR disputes? The Supreme Court then dismissed the writ as
improvidently granted, and Medellin returned to the Texas Criminal
Court of Appeals, requesting relief based on the ICJ decision and the
Bush Memorandum.'
While Medellin's case was in the Texas court system, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the consolidated cases of
Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon and Bustillo v Virgina Department of
Corrections to consider the availability of an appropriate remedy for an
article 36 violation.92 Bustillo's case was similar to the earlier ones in
that he raised his claim for the first time in habeas proceedings in
86. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004). The Fifth Circuit acknowledged
the ICJ judgment, but denied relief on the basis that Medellin's claims were procedurally
defaulted and its prior holding that the VCCR does not create individually enforceable rights.
Id. at 279-80.
87. Medellin v. Dretke, 543 U.S. 1032, 1032 (2004).
88. Memorandum from President George W Bush to the Attorney General (Feb. 28,
2005).
89. Id.
90. Frederic L. Kirgis, Addendum to ASIL Insight, President Bush s Determinaton
Regarding Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rtghs; ASIL INSIGHTS, Mar. 2005,
http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insights050309a.htnl (quoting letter from U.S. Sec'y of
State Condoleezza Rice to the United Nations Secretary-General (Mar. 7, 2005) (announcing
United States withdrawal from the Optional Protocol)).
91. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660,666-67 (2005).
92. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 1001 (2005). In the consoldated cases,
the Court granted certiorari to decide three issues: whether article 36 creates individual rights
that may be invoked in a criminal or post-conviction proceeding, whether a violation of these
rights requires suppression of any statements made to law enforcement as a remedy, and
whether a state may treat a defendant's article 36 claim as procedurally defaulted if he failed
to raise it at trial. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006).
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Virginia.93 Sanchez-Llamas, however, had filed a pretrial motion to
suppress the statements he gave at the time of arrest on the grounds
that they were involuntary and that he was not notified of his article 36
rights. ' Despite the ICJ's decision, the United States again took the
position that the VCCR creates no individual rights that can be
enforced in U.S. courts." However, in deciding the case, the Court
never reached this enforceability issue. Rather, the Court assumed that
article 36 creates judicially enforceable individual rights, but rejected
its own authority to require state courts to provide a remedy.96
Sanchez-Llamas had urged the Court to "require suppression for
Article 36 violations as a matter of [its] 'authority to develop remedies
for the enforcement of federal law in state-court criminal proceed-
ings."'97 The Court rejected that argument, however, explaining that it
"do[es] not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several
States" except to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension.98 The
Court concluded that "where a treaty does not provide a particular
remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for the federal courts to
impose one on the States through lawmaking of their own.'"' Thus, in
Sanchez-Llamas, the Court appears to have gone even further in its
deference to state court authority and autonomy than it had in Breard
and LaGrand not only has the Court determined that state procedural
rules trump treaty rights, but also that it is without authority to remedy
even those violations of treaty rights that are properly invoked in the
state judicial system.
Even after Sanchez-Llamas, however, there remained the
possibility that VCCR violations could be remedied through executive
action to enforce the ICJ's judgment. Following that case, Medellin
returned to the Supreme Court, appealing a decision from the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals that rejected his claims for relief based on
93. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 341-42.
94. This motion was denied and Sanchez-Llamas was convicted and sentenced to
over twenty years in prison. Id. at 340.
95. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11-15,
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 598 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 05-51, 04-10566).
96. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 345-47.
97. Id
98. Id at 347 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
99. The Court then went on to explain, apparently in dicta, why suppression would
not in any event be an appropriate remedy for a treaty violation and concluded by reiterating
the Breard holding that treaty claims could be procedurally defaulted under state law if not
raised at trial. Id at 347-60.
1042 [Vol. 84:1025
2010] HULAN RIGHTS TREA TYIMPLEMENTA TION 1043
the Avena decision and the Bush Memorandum. ' In a six-three
decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Texas court,
concluding that nothing in relevant treaties and case law indicated that
the Avenajudgment was binding on state courts and that the President
could not unilaterally make an ICJ judgment binding.'"' The majority
noted:
[T]he Government ha[d] not identified a single instance in which the
President ha[d] attempted (or Congress ha[d] acquiesced in) a
Presidential directive issued to state courts, much less one that reaches
deep into the heart of the State's police powers and compels state courts
to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally applicable
state laws.' 2
After the Supreme Court affirmed the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals' dismissal of his writ of habeas corpus, Medellin filed a
subsequent writ of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, seeking to stay his execution on the grounds that his case was
still pending before the ICJ and that legislative action was possible
both in the United States House of Representatives and the Texas
Senate.'°3 His request was rejected by both the Texas court and,
ultimately, by the United States Supreme Court with four justices
dissenting."'° With no place left to turn in the federal government,
100. The Texas court had held that the Avena decision is not federal law that binds U.S.
courts and concluded that the "President ha[d] exceeded his constitutional authority by
intruding into the independent powers of the judiciary" to determine "what law to apply or
how to interpret the applicable law." Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W3d 315, 335 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006).
101. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371-72 (2008).
102. Id. at 1372.
103. This application was based on "new developments" including the Supreme
Court's decision in Medellin and Mexico's subsequent filing in the ICJ seeking to clarify the
meaning of the Avena decision; the existence of a new bill in the United States House of
Representatives that would have given the Mexican nationals the right to the "review and
reconsideration" required by Aven,
the indication by a Texas Senator that he [would] introduce similar legislation ...
in the 2009 session; and ... the fact that the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, allegedly the only body to have reviewed all of the evidence
pertaining to [Medellin's] Vienna Convention violation under the standard required
by the ICJ ... [had] issued its preliminary fmidings concluding [he] was prejudiced
by the violation of his Vienna Convention rights.
Ex parte Medellin, 280 S.W3d 854, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
104. In rejecting the stay application, the majority relied upon the inaction of other
federal actors to justify its decision. The majority noted:
It is up to Congress whether to implement obligations undertaken under a treaty
which (like this one) does not itself have the force and effect of domestic law
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Medellin then requested a stay of execution from Texas Governor Rick
Perry.' 5 Governor Perry promptly denied the stay, despite the pleas of
the Supreme Court, President George W Bush, Mexico, and the
United Nations Secretary General."° Medellin was executed by the
State of Texas on August 5, 2008. '07
The more recent VCCR cases continue the pattern set out in
Breard and LaGrand Notwithstanding the decision by the interna-
tional court charged with resolving treaty disputes regarding the
VCCR's obligations, the executive has maintained its view that VCCR
rights can be implemented only through diplomatic efforts between
signatory states. This position ignores the fact that history suggests
that federalism concerns limit the executive's ability to offer any
meaningful remedy to a state VCCR violation through diplomatic
channels. In Brear the United States adopted a deferential posture
towards the State of Virginia, asking for Breard's execution to be
stayed pending the ICJ judgment, while simultaneously arguing to the
Supreme Court (and assuring the state) that it had no legal obligation
to do so.' The executive's request was summarily ignored. 9 The only
relief the United States was able to offer was a formal apology to
Paraguay for the violation." Similarly, Medellin was executed despite
sufficient to set aside the judgment or the ensuing sentence, and Congress has not
progressed beyond the bare introduction of a bill in the four years since the ICJ
ruling and the four months since our ruling in Medellin v Texas.
This inaction is consistent with the President's decision in 2005 to withdraw the United
States' accession to jurisdiction of the ICJ with regard to matters arising under the
Convention. Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360, 361 (2008) (citation omitted).
In dissent, Justice Stevens reiterated his concerns about the decision's impact upon the
United States' international reputation, because "[b]alancing the honor of the Nation against
the modest burden of a short delay to ensure that the breach is unavoidable convince[d] [him]
that the application for a stay should be granted" Id at 362. Both Justices Ginsburg and
Souter argued a stay of execution should be granted until the conclusion of the proceedings
before the ICJ. Id at 362-63. Justice Souter would also have granted the stay to give time for
Congress to act on the Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong., 2d
Sess. (2008). Id Justice Breyer agreed with Justices Ginsburg and Souter, but also explicitly
stated that Medellin's execution placed the United States in violation of international law. Id.
at 363-64.
105. See James C. McKinley Jr., Texas Executes Mexican Despite Objections, N.Y
TIMEs, Aug. 6, 2008, at AI9.
106. See id.
107. Lyons, supra note 72, at 74.
108. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,376-78 (1998).
109. Id
110. One scholar has characterized this case as "a classic example of the inertness
(perhaps deliberately chosen) of the federal government under a mistaken interpretation of its
inability to mandate state compliance with U.S. treaty obligations." Craig Jackson, TheAnti-
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requests from President George W Bush (himself a former Texas
governor) and from several members of the Supreme Court.'
Because of the federalist structure of criminal prosecutions, the vast
majority of VCCR violations will occur in cases like Breard and
Medellitr, thus the diplomatic efforts will not be between the VCCR
parties, but rather between the United States' federal government and
the noncomplying state. The United States' ability to offer a
diplomatic solution will therefore depend upon its ability to coax states
into acknowledging and offering a remedy for VCCR violations.
Moreover, it now appears that the executive actually lacks the
ability to require states to remedy VCCR violations (and arguably, the
ability to require implementation of the treaty)."'  The sole (and
limited) coercive enforcement effort undertaken by the executive
branch in any of the VCCR cases, the Bush Memorandum, was
rejected first by the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals and ultimately by
the Supreme Court as infringing upon the prerogatives of federalism."3
Although stating that the "President may comply with the treaty's
obligations by some other means," consistent with our constitutional
structure, the Court in Medellin neglected to articulate what those
"means" would be."' Thus, after Medellin, the executive branch may
be left in the position of asking for state cooperation in VCCR
implementation, but having no redress if such cooperation is not
forthcoming.
Commandeering Doctrine and Foreign Policy Federaism-The Missing Issue in Medellin v.
Texas, 31 SUFFOLKTRANSNAT'LL. REv. 335, 363 (2008).
111. Id. at 336-39.
112. At the very least, the executive appears to lack the ability to enforce treaties
deemed to be non-self-executing. See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371 (2008).
There is precedent to suggest that the executive may bring suit in federal court to enforce self-
executing treaties. See Ku, supra note 11, at 516-18. However, given the heightened bar that
Medellin appears to impose on finding self-execution, it seems likely that the VCCR will
ultimately be found to be non-self-executing, at least by the traditional definition. See infra
note 138 and accompanying text.
113. Notably, even while asserting federal authority to enforce the Avena judgment,
President Bush assured the states that such "interference" would not occur in the future by
withdrawing from the Optional Protocol submitting the United States to the jurisdiction of the
ICJ to resolve disputes over VCCR rights. It is possible, therefore, that the judicial players in
this case felt that the President's effort lacked serious commitment to obtaining relief. In
rejecting the Bush Memorandum, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals indicated that it might
have looked more favorably upon an Executive Agreement between the United States and
Mexico. ExparteMedellin, 223 S.W3d 315, 342-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Whether that
is true or not, the Administration took no additional steps after that decision to buffer
Executive authority or to persuade Congress.
114. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1371.
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The federal courts also appear to have abdicated responsibility for
remedying VCCR violations. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court
has yet to find that article 36 is judicially unenforceable, most federal
courts that have addressed this question have reached this conclusion
on their own."5 Thus, federal courts have tied their own hands. Like
the federal executive, the federal judiciary is now in the position of
requesting and encouraging state compliance with the VCCR while
simultaneously denying its own ability to do anything to compel it.
Justice Stevens acknowledged this in his Medellin concurrence. He
noted:
Under the express terms of the Supremacy Clause, the United States'
obligation to "undertak[e] to comply" with the ICJ's decision falls on
each of the States as well as the Federal Government. One consequence
of our form of government is that sometimes States must shoulder the
primary responsibility for protecting the honor and integrity of the
Nation. Texas' duty in this respect is all the greater since it was Texas
that-by failing to provide consular notice in accordance with the
Vienna Convention-ensnared the United States in the current
controversy. Having already put the Nation in breach of one treaty [the
VCCR], it is now up to Texas to prevent the breach of another [the
Optional Protocol]. 
16
Justice Stevens then went on to urge Texas to take on the "modest cost
of compliance" and review and reconsider Medellin's sentence."7
Texas, of course, rejected this request."8
Thus, the result of Sanchez-Llamas and Medellin is that state
violations of article 36 cannot currently be remedied by the federal
government. Without undermining the validity of the VCCR as a legal
matter or declaring it unenforceable in U.S. courts, the Supreme Court
(usually in concert with the executive) has left VCCR enforcement
115. Federal courts have "whenever possible ... sidestepped the question of whether
the treaty creates individual rights-typically by concluding that remedies such as
suppression of evidence or dismissal of an indictment are not available even if the treaty
creates individual rights." United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F3d 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2001).
Generally, those that have reached the issue have rejected the claim in both criminal
prosecutions and in civil cases brought pursuant to § 1983. See id. at 391-94 (criminal);
Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008); Comejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F3d
853, 859-64 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that article 36 does not create judicially enforceable
individual rights); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198-99 (5th Cir.), cert.
denieg 533 U.S. 962 (2001) (criminal). ButsevJogi v. Voges, 480 E3d 822, 834-36 (7th Cir.
2007) (holding that article 36 gives rise to individually enforceable rights under § 1983).
116. 128 S. Ct. at 1374.
117. Idat 1375.
118. ExparteMedellin, 280 S.W3d 854, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
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essentially to the good will of the states.' 9 This strategy worked in at
least one case. In Avena, the ICJ expressed "great concern" that
Oklahoma had already set a date for execution for one of the Mexican
nationals, Osbaldo Torres, whose case was part of Mexico's action in
the ICJ.2' Following the ICJ judgment, the Oklahoma Court of
Appeals stayed Torres' execution and ordered an evidentiary hearing
on whether Torres had been prejudiced by the lack of consular
notification.'2' On the same day, Governor Brad Henry of Oklahoma
commuted Torres' death sentence to life without the possibility of
parole.'2  After the evidentiary hearing, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals held that Torres had failed to establish prejudice with
respect to the guilt phase of his trial and that any prejudice with respect
to the sentencing phase had been mooted by the commutation order. 3
The Torres case demonstrates that state government may exercise
its independent authority to remedy violations of the VCCR. However,
the federal Medellin case shows how impotent federal actors are when
states refuse to do so. The significant point is that the United States'
ability to "speak in one voice" in its diplomatic negotiations over
VCCR violations is entirely undermined by the executive's inability to
enforce national obligations on the states.
Of course, Congress could pass legislation implementing the ICJ
judgment or providing a standard remedy for violations of the VCCR.
The majority in Medellin repeatedly noted that "Congress is up to the
task of implementing non-self-executing treaties, even those involving
complex commercial disputes."'2 Although any action by Congress to
implement the VCCR would likely be formally authorized under
119. In Medein, the Court reiterated that "the United States' interpretation of a treaty
'is entitled to great weight,"' Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1361 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc.
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)), and noted that "[t]he Executive Branch has
unfailingly adhered to its view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable
federal law." Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 27-29, Sumitomo, 457
U.S. 176 (Nos. 80-2070, 81-24)).
120. Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Avena), 2004
I.C.J. 128, at *21 (Judgment of Mar. 31).
121. SeeTorres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623, at * 1 (Okla. Crim.
App. May 13,2004).
122. In explaining his decision, Governor Henry emphasized that (1) the United States
signed the VCCR, (2) that VCCR is "important in protecting the rights of American citizens
abroad," (3) the ICJ ruled that Torres' rights had been violated, and (4) the U.S. State
Department urged his office to give careful consideration to the United States' treaty
obligations. See Press Release, Office of Governor Brad Henry, Gov. Henry Grants
Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), http://www.ok.gov/governor/
display.article.php?articleid=301& articletype=l.
123. Tores v. State, 120 P.3d 1184, 1188-90 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
124. Medelln, 128 S. Ct. at 1366; seeid at 1366 n.12.
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Hollana it is unlikely to be forthcoming because it would require
Congress to legislate deeply and specifically in an area of traditional
state control. Given Congress's unwillingness in recent decades to rely
upon the treaty power, even with the support of the Hollandprecedent,
it seems unlikely that Congress will take this opportunity to pass
legislation that would be so politically charged and that could set up a
constitutional challenge.'25
The VCCR cases illustrate the multilayered complexities of
enforcing international human rights treaties in our federalist system.
Because criminal law has historically been an area reserved to the
states, detaining officials are typically members of state and local law
enforcement agencies."6 Therefore, attempts to bring the United States
into compliance with its treaty obligations under the VCCR have had
to contend with the fact that proper implementation of the VCCR
requires education and coordination of law enforcement officials in
fifty states.'27 Furthermore, these prosecutions generally go forward in
state courts. Thus, efforts on the part of criminal defendants to seek
remedies for VCCR violations have brought treaty enforcement into
direct conflict with state criminal procedure. Finally, federalism
concerns have limited federal actors' willingness and ability to exert
federal authority to remedy VCCR violations. This sends the signal to
state actors that there is no consequence for their noncompliance.
Many international law scholars would and have argued that this
is all smoke and mirrors-that a correct understanding of the
Constitution renders treaty law the "Supreme law of the land," and
therefore, that the VCCR should be enforced in and on the states
without regard to contradictory state law.'8 What the VCCR cases
demonstrate, however, is that the present reality is far more
challenging. Political and jurisprudential concerns about protecting
the integrity of our federalist structure prevent federal actors from
enforcing remedies for VCCR violations by the states. Any plan to
125. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
126. Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellin Matter, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 617, 619 (2008).
127. This is despite the fact that "the underlying policy goal-that all foreign
defendants should receive consular notification-has been accepted by the United States as a
valuable objective deserving of governmental support and implementation." Leading Cases,
120 HARv. L. RE. 303, 310-11 (2006) (citing Telegram from U.S. Department of State to All
U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Posts Abroad Concerning Consular Assistance for American
Nationals Abroad (Jan. 1, 2001), http://www.state.gov/s/l/16139.htm ("[C]onsular notifica-
tion ... has long been crucial to providing basic protective services abroad.... [T]he
Department is working to improve our record domestically.")).
128. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 5, at 391-92; Davis, supra note 9, at 369-70; Ku,
supra note 2, at 345-46.
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move towards compliance with our international obligations must
therefore take this reality into account. Moreover, rethinking this
internationalist approach to VCCR implementation might well lead to
more innovative and successful implementation strategies.
III. RESOLVING THE IMPASSE
As I have demonstrated, federal actors have been hesitant to cross
traditional federalism boundaries to impose VCCR requirements on
recalcitrant state actors. However, state authorities have been slow to
fill the void created by lack of federal action, and, in fact, generally
appear to have taken the view that federal inaction represents a license
to ignore treaty mandates with impunity. Federalism principles have
therefore presented a barrier to the enforcement of VCCR rights-that
is, they have been interpreted to "protect" the criminal justice systems
of the states from the intrusive authority of the federal government.
This need not be the case, however. Federalism principles could also
be interpreted not only to provide an opportunity for proactive state
engagement in VCCR implementation, but also to require such
engagement. Nonetheless, those most dedicated to VCCR enforce-
ment have generally continued to push solely for the traditional
internationalist view of treaty implementation.'29 In this Part, I will
suggest that both practically and normatively, a dynamic federalist
approach to implementation of the VCCR has much to offer.
However, if this opportunity is to be exploited, it will necessitate
reframing what federalism means in this context.
The dilemma in human rights treaty implementation is illustrative
of the problems of traditional "dual federalism," which, in its attempt
to draw lines separating areas of state and federal authority, fails to
recognize the reality that "[t]he federal government and the states have
extensive areas of concurrent authority [i]n many realms, from
narcotics trafficking to securities trading to education.""'3 In recent
years, numerous scholars have also argued that as a normative matter,
dual federalism fails to recognize the productive possibilities that could
emerge from jurisdictional overlap.' Properly understood, Robert
Schapiro contends, "hamess[ing] the gains that flow from the
129. Louis Henkin has gone so far as to say that federalism is "largely irrelevant to the
conduct of foreign affairs." HENKiN, supra note 32, at 149-50; see also David M. Golove,
Treaty-Making and the Nadon: The Histoncal Foundatons of the Natonalist Concepton of
the TreatyPower, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1078 (2000).
130. Schapiro, supra note 13, at 246 (footnotes omitted).
131. Id. at 246-48.
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overlapping exercise of power" leads to "the valuable characteristics of
plurality, dialogue, and redundancy"''  Plurality refers to the
possibility federalism offers for offering "a variety of different
responses ... encouraging policy experimentation.""'3 It captures the
notion of the states as "laboratories," and recognizes that "the
appropriate regulations may differ from region to region.' ' The
experience of plurality is enhanced by the possibility of dialogue
between institutional actors, permitting further innovation resulting
from shared experiences. '  Finally, "Regulatory overlap facilitates
redundancy as well. If one set of regulators fails to address the
problem, another set provides an alternative avenue for relief."'' 6
The VCCR cases present an interesting nuance on much of the
existing federalism scholarship. Whereas most of that scholarship
focuses on the problem of coordinating the actions of competing state
and federal actors, in the VCCR cases, the problem is not one of
competing action, but of consistent inaction. The United States'
VCCR obligations have fallen into a jurisdictional gap. The solution is
therefore not just one of authority and coordination, but of ownership
and responsibility. Presumably, therefore, the appropriate dynamic
federalism model for treaty implementation must diverge somewhat
from that posited by Powell, Resnik and others in the context of
foreign affairs preemption.' 7 Valid treaties bind the United States to
particular international commitments. Thus it is not enough simply to
create the space for state participation and experimentation. States
must act to fill that space, and there must be a corrective mechanism if
they do not. This is the current challenge in implementing the VCCR
rights.
As a doctrinal matter, the space currently exists for state
institutions to implement and remedy violations of the notification
provision of the VCCR. The Supreme Court has thus far assumed that
the VCCR is self-executing, which means that as a ratified treaty, the
VCCR operates as federal law, thus requiring the states to enforce the
132. Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE




135. Schapiro references Kirsten Engel's illustration of this phenomenon in the
development of national low-emission vehicle standards. Id at 44. See generally Engel,
supm note 19, at 171-73.
136. Schapiro, supam note 132, at 44.
137. See generallyPowell, supra note 14; Resnik, supra note 23.
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rights therein.'38 The State Department also takes the position that
"[i]mplementing legislation is not necessary (and the VCCR and
bilateral agreements are thus 'self-executing') because executive, law
enforcement, and judicial authorities can implement these obligations
through their existing powers.""' Thus, at present, the states have an
affirmative obligation to take steps to ensure that foreign nationals
receive their VCCR rights, and a number of them have done so."'
However, states have been slow to fill this gap. Actual
implementation of the VCCR rights by the states has been patchy.
Only two states have amended their criminal codes to explicitly require
police notification in all arrests, although additional states have
considered proposals.'"' "Texas has produced a sixty-seven page
manual outlining requirements, procedures, and forms to be used in
compliance with Article 36," but has historically resisted implementing
138. See Ku, supra note 11, at 462 (noting the importance of the states in helping the
United States reach compliance with non-self-executing treaties). Medellfn may also have
been a watershed decision in terms of defining or redefining what it means to declare a treaty
"non-self-executing." In a footnote, the Court noted this ongoing uncertainty and provided its
own definition. The Court stated, "What we mean by 'self-executing' is that the treaty has
automatic domestic effect ... upon ratification. Conversely, a 'non-self-executing' treaty
does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has
domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress." Medellin v.
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 n.2 (2008).
As Steve Vladeck noted in the immediate aftermath of the decision, if this terse
statement means that ratified treaties do not constitute binding federal law, "this is an
extremely important development, and one that seems thoroughly at odds with the plain text
of the Supremacy Clause (to wit, ... 'all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... .')." Posting of
Steve Vladeck to Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org/2008/03/25/Medellin-non-self-executing-
treaties-and-the-supremacy-clause/ (Mar. 25, 2008 13:52 EST) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2). Nonetheless, at least one state court has already concluded that this statement means
that the VCCR is not enforceable federal law. Gikonyo v. State, 283 S.W3d 631, 636 (Ark.
App. 2008).
139. See Consular Notification and Access, Part 5: Legal Material, http://travel.state.
gov/law/consular/consular_744.html (last visited July 7, 2009).
140. Moreover, because the Supreme Court has carefully avoided rejecting the position
that the VCCR creates a judicially enforceable individual right, it has actually created an
opening for state courts to engage directly with the VCCR. That is, the Court has left space
for state courts to determine independently whether the VCCR is enforceable and then to
design a remedy for any violation consistent with state law. However, in practice, this has not
led to more judicial engagement with treaty rights. Most state courts have followed the
majority of lower federal courts in finding the VCCR unenforceable. See, e.g., State v.
Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P3d 267, 274 ((N.M. 2001), cert. denieg 535 U.S. 937 (2002); State
v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P3d 573, 578 (Or. 2005); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.3d 57, 64
(Va. 1998), cert. denied 527 U.S. 1038 (1999); State v. Navarro, 659 N.W2d 487, 494 (Wisc.
Ct. App. 2003).
141. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 834c, 5028 (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642
(2005).
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its requirements.' 2 Most states, however, have not taken proactive
steps to incorporate the notification right into state law, and some have
actively taken steps to flout the VCCR's requirements. 3
Numerous reasons have been proposed for the states' failure to
comply with the VCCR's mandate, including lack of knowledge and
lack of capacity.'" However, given that most courts-both state and
federal-have found the VCCR to be judicially unenforceable, there is
also no consequence for noncompliance, particularly now that the
Supreme Court has found that neither the executive nor the federal
courts may step in to remedy state VCCR violations. Thus, the
incentives for affirmative state action towards VCCR implementation
are extremely weak. Additionally, there may still be ambiguity about
the meaning of state action to enforce the VCCR-whether it is an
expression of political cooperation or political defiance. 45
The challenge is to encourage states to see federalism as
providing a mandate and not just creating a shield. Thus, the model of
dynamic federalism that seems most appropriate in the context of the
VCCR is one where the treaty provides a "floor" below which the
states may not fall, but then leaves the specifics of implementation and
remedy primarily in the hands of the states.' 6 In his dissent in
142. Samson, supra note 80, at 1114; see also Reynaldo Anaya Valencia, Craig L.
Jackson, Leticia Van de Putte & Rodney Ellis, Avena and the World Courtt Death Penalty
Jurisdiction in Texas: Addressing the Odd Notion of Texas's Independence from the World,
23 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 455, 503 (2005).
143. Marc J. Kadish & Charles C. Olson, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon andArticle 36of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations The Supreme Court, The Right to Counsel,
and Remedation, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1185, 1232 (2006). Florida's statute explicitly states
that "failure to provide consular notification under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations ... shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding against any foreign national
and shall not be cause for the foreign national's discharge from custody." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 901.26 (West 2009) Compliance overall has improved due to the combined efforts of
federal and state agencies, the members of the bar who litigate these cases, and the activities
of nongovernmental organization and foreign nation-states. See generally Levit, supra note
126. However, even Professor Levit's analysis offers only this same handful of examples of
state action on VCCR implementation, which seem insufficient to demonstrate a real sense of
responsibility at the state level for treaty compliance.
144. Samson, supm note 80, at 1115-16.
145. For example, Martha Davis has recently suggested that "California's adoption of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations standards could be seen as thumbing the state's
nose at Congress's decision to not enact legislation implementing the treaty on the national
level." Martha Davis, Upstairs, Downstairs: Subnationa Incorporation of International
Human Rights Law at the End ofan Era, 77 FORDHAm L. RE. 411,421 (2008). I would offer
an alternative explanation-that is, that California's adoption of the VCCR demonstrates its
compliance with its designated role in treaty implementation in our federalist structure.
146. A "floor" requires states to comply with a "minimal required level of stringency
or protection," but permits state and local governments to offer "greater protection from risk."
William W Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
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Sanchez-Llamas, Justice Breyer recognizes and proposes this model of
dynamic federalism as a way to bring the state into compliance with its
Convention obligations.' 7
Justice Breyer would have held that the VCCR is self-executing
and enforceable by individuals in U.S. courts."' He would not,
however, have had the Supreme Court dictate a remedy for any VCCR
violation.9 Rather, he would have "remand[ed] the[] [consolidated]
cases, thereby permitting the States to apply their own procedural and
remedial laws, but with the understanding that the Federal Constitution
requires that the application of those laws be consistent with the
Convention's demand for an effective remedy for an Article 36
violation.""'5  Breyer envisioned that state courts would develop
remedies for VCCR violations that are consistent with state law. His
proposal would have permitted treaty rights to be enforced differently
in different states, with federal courts able to review state court
decisions only to the extent of determining whether the state remedy is
"effective" within the meaning of the VCCR. Thus, Breyer's solution
would create the possibility for dynamic federalism in the
implementation of international human rights treaties because it would
recognize that consular notification is neither inherently a "state" issue,
nor a "federal" issue, but rather a challenge that could benefit from
shared responsibility through jurisdictional overlap.''
Distinction, 82 N.YU. L. REV. 1547, 1558-59 (2007). By contrast, a ceiling, "[i]n its actual
manifestations" creates a "federal standard [that] coincides with or undercuts all other
standards... leav[ing] no opportunity for modifications by others." Id.
147. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 365-98 (2008).
148. Id.
149. Id
150. Id. at 366.
151. Of course, the additional challenge that Breyer's solution would face (even if a
majority of the Court could be persuaded to his position) is the possibility that the VCCR will
eventually be found to be non-self-executing or unenforceable in U.S. courts. Breyer's model
relies on the presumption that the VCCR is both (if indeed footnote 2 is intended to indicate
that these are distinct concepts). See supra note 138 and accompanying text. If the VCCR is
ultimately held to be non-self-executing, and non-self-execution means that the treaty does
not even take effect until implementing litigation is passed, then states would be relieved not
only of the duty to remedy violations of these rights, but of their responsibility for enforcing
the VCCR, until such legislation is passed.
As I have previously explained, Congress could pass legislation under Hollandcodifying
the rights guaranteed in the VCCR in federal law and structuring a standard remedy. But
Congress is unlikely to be willing to risk the political consequences of passing implementing
legislation that intrudes so deeply into an area otherwise controlled by the States. It might be
more politically palatable, however, for Congress to pass implementing legislation that simply
renders the ratified human rights treaty valid and judicially enforceable as part of U.S. law.
This would protect Congress somewhat from the politically and practically challenging
position of attempting to translate the VCCR into detailed domestic legislation as it has done
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The advantages of this dynamic federalism model would in many
ways be similar to those identified by proponents of the "floor"
approach in other contexts in the way that it would help to capture the
benefits of plurality, dialogue, and redundancy. States are impacted
differently by the mandates of the VCCR, and thus "[t]here are many
reasons why the optimal remedy ... in one state might be different
from the optimal remedy in another. ' 52 For example, VCCR violations
have been and will probably continue to be more frequent in border
states with large populations of foreign nationals.' In those states, it
might make sense for the legislature to develop a standardized remedy
for VCCR violations. By contrast, in states in which violations are
rare, legislatures might choose to permit their courts to develop
individualized remedies for particular cases that are consistent with the
VCCR's demand for an effective remedy. It is possible that some
states might choose to offer an "effective remedy" through the
payment of damages in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, rather than in the
course of the original criminal prosecution.' 4 Additionally, a state in
which the opportunities for violation are infrequent might determine
that it would rather bear the cost of remedying the occasional violation
(and the potential damage to the prosecution) than invest extensively in
training its law enforcement officials to ensure full compliance with
the VCCR's mandates. Conversely, in a state in which foreign nationals
make up a larger part of the population, and a correspondingly larger
percentage of arrestees, an upfront investment in retraining law
enforcement to notify all arrestees of their VCCR rights might be the
more attractive option. As state courts and legislatures explored the
with the treaties that is has ratified. And it would place them into a position in which Breyer's
solution would be workable.
152. Ilya Somin, A Floor, Not a Ceiling: Federalism and Remedies for Violations of
Constitutional Rights in Danforth v. Minnesota, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 365, 371
(2008).
153. Seeid.
154. Defining a floor for remedying VCCR treaty violations would be somewhat more
complicated than for the human rights treaties discussed in Part IV in , as the rights
guaranteed by VCCR protect the rights of the nation-state, not just its citizen. See, e.g.,
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Avena), 2004 I.C.J. 128, at
* 12, "19 (Judgment of Mar. 31). The Government of Mexico requested a finding from the
ICJ "that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, convicting, and sentencing the 54
Mexican nationals on death row... violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in
its own right and in the exercise of its right of consular protection of its nationals." Id
Therefore, it is unclear whether the payment of damages would actually satisfy the VCCR's
demand for an effective remedy. However, some forms of individual relief would presumably
satisfy the State. In its petition to the IC, for example, Mexico requested that the convictions
and sentences of its nationals be vacated. Id. at *20-21.
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potential paths to VCCR compliance (either through additional
investment in avoiding violations or additional investment in
remedying those that occur), the dialogic opportunities of federalism
would be realized. That is, state courts and legislatures could learn
from each other's successes and failures, modifying their own policies
based on lessons learned from the laboratory of the fifty states.
Finally, the interaction of state and federal efforts to encourage treaty
compliance and to remedy violations would offer the benefit of
redundancy.
Beyond these traditional benefits, adopting a dynamic federalist
approach in the particular context of international human rights treaty
implementation could have an additional advantage. Returning to the
initial problem with which I began, federalism concerns, both doctrinal
and political, have impeded the United States' ability to meet its
international obligations under the VCCR. Therefore, "By leaving
much of the incorporation, implementation, and execution of
international law to the states, the federal government [could] confer
the greatest amount of political legitimacy on the new international
law."'55 This is not to say that placing states in the primary position of
remedying VCCR rights would eliminate noncompliance. I have
argued that the states already occupy this position and yet few have
really engaged with this role.'56 A federal mandate to states to take on
that role-enforced by federal review power-is clearly necessary if
the United States, as a nation, is to meet its international obligations.
Nonetheless, a federal review power that allows and encourages states
to be the primary innovators and that obviates the need for detailed
incursions into the workings of state criminal processes could help
make the intrusion that is required more palatable to those who must
enforce it.'
Given the potential benefits of a federalist approach to human
rights treaty interpretation and implementation, it is interesting that
little of the extensive scholarship exploring the new possibilities of
federalism has suggested it in this context. This may be because the
competition and policy variation that federalism permits may be
viewed as incompatible with the United States' ability to speak with a
155. Ku, supranote 11,at531-32.
156. See supra Part II.
157. A recent New York Times article suggested, for example, that the Obama
Administration is open to experimenting with regulation through dynamic federalism. John
Schwartz, Obama Seems ToBe Open to a Broader Role for States, N.Y TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2009,
at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30federal.html?_r =I1&
scp= 1 &sq--federalism%20obama&st=cse.
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single voice at the international level.' However, at least in the
example of the VCCR, this view ignores the possibility that the
opportunity for diverse interpretations is built into the treaty structure.
The language of the VCCR acknowledges that the convention rights
will be "exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for
which the rights accorded under this article are intended."'5 9 Therefore,
the VCCR explicitly anticipates that the rights embodied in article 36
will be implemented differently by the States parties, in order to be
consistent with national law. Thus, the "floor" solution simply
replicates the global treaty structure within the federalist state.
Moreover, the controlled variation permitted by this type of
federalist structure appears in a variety of forms in U.S. law,
particularly in areas of overlap between state and federal authority. As
I have explained, Justice Breyer's proposal mirrors an existing
phenomenon in U.S. law where federal law provides a minimum
"floor" against which varying state policies are tested and ultimately
approved or rejected." In the regulatory context, space is often left for
independent state initiatives that exceed federal regulatory
minimums.'6' "Such cooperative federalism schemes are especially
prevalent in the environmental law field."'' 2  Examples include the
Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act.'63
A floor approach has also been implemented in the context of
insurance regulation.'" At the most basic level, the states have long
been free to set their own minimum wage rates above the federally
mandated standard, and some have taken advantage of this opportunity
158. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941). The "full and exclusive
responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties" lies with the federal
government, and "the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting
foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference." Id
159. SeeVCCR, supr note 25, art. 36(2).
160. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 365-98 (2006).
161. William W Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism
Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION, 98, 101 (William W Buzbee ed., 2009).
162. Id
163. See id at 101 n.6 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2) (2006) (Endangered Species
Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (2006) (Clean Air
Act)).
164. See Note, Public-Pivate Partnerships and Insurance Regulation, 121 HARv. L.
REv. 1367, 1380 (2008) (describing the use of a regulatory floor in the context of imple-
menting the Medicaid Partnership for Long-Term Care).
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to increase wage minimums during periods where the federal wage
rates stagnated.'
65
The Supreme Court has also incorporated a floor approach into
federal constitutional jurisprudence." In these cases, the "floor" often
emerges out of the dialogue between sovereigns.'67 In the area of
criminal law and procedure, Robert Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff
have detailed how the Warren Court provided a general outline of the
rights to which criminal defendants are entitled under the federal
Constitution." These rights were then interpreted and clarified
through a dialogue between state criminal courts, which dealt with
these principles in the first instance, and federal courts, which
considered the same issues again on habeas.9  New understanding
arose out of the conversation enabled by jurisdictional overlap between
separate sovereigns. Sometimes, the result of this process was that the
Supreme Court ultimately weighed in, setting a federal standard which
binds the states. For example, in Batson v Kentucky, the Supreme
Court considered how state courts had been handling questions of
racial discrimination in the selection of juries before reaching its
decision."' "By allowing the issue to 'percolate' in the state courts, the
United States Supreme Court was able to draw from a broad body of
law before revisiting its decision in Swain v Alabama." '" However, in
other cases, the Court appears to have concluded that the constitutional
standard could tolerate diversity. For example, despite numerous
challenges, the Supreme Court has refused to impose a unanimity
requirement for criminal convictions, finding that a variety of
numerical possibilities satisfy the constitutional standard.' 2 Diversity
165. Franklin Foer, Essay: The Joy of Federalism (Mar. 6, 2005), http://query.nytimes.
com/gst/fullpage.html?res--9405EFDF143DF935A35750COA9639C8B63&scp=3&sq--feder
alism&st=cse.
166. SeegeneMlyBuzbee, supm note 146.
167. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Cour, 86YALE L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977).
168. Id. at 1045.
169. See id. at 1035-37. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional
Redundancy: Interest Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639 (1981).
170. 476 U.S. 79, 82 n.1, 83,99 n.22 (1986).
171. Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28
N.M. L. REv. 199,206 (1998) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
172. SeeApodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (approving 11-1 or 10-2 jury
verdicts); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972) (approving 9-3 verdict). Other
cases, however, make clear that there is some constitutional floor that states must meet. See
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979) (holding nonunanimous six-person jury
unconstitutional); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 228 (1978) (holding jury of fewer than
five persons unconstitutional).
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in the implementation of fundamental rights has thus consistently been
a part of our jurisprudential landscape.
Finally, in the recent decision Danforth v Minnesoia,'" the Court
chose to limit the preemptive power of its own decisions and create a
"floor" structure for remedying federal constitutional violations.'74 In
Danforth, the Court freed state courts to determine independently
whether to apply new rules of constitutional criminal procedure
retroactively, finding that state courts may provide victims of federal
constitutional rights violations broader remedies than those mandated
by its own decisions.'" Thus, although the federal courts remain the
ultimate arbiters of determining when a federal right has been violated,
there is still space for state courts to participate in the dialogue about
how best to remedy these violations. In reaching this holding, the
Court acknowledged the predominant role of state courts in managing
state criminal prosecutions.' 6 It explained that the "federalism and
comity" concerns that animated the presumption against retroactivity
are inapplicable when state courts are reviewing their own convictions,
and noted that there is "fundamental interest in federalism that allows
individual States to define crimes, punishments, rules of evidence, and
rules of criminal and civil procedure in a variety of different ways-so
long as they do not violate the Federal Constitution.""' The Court
indicated, therefore, a willingness to permit a dialogic floor approach
to federal constitutional law in traditional areas of state control and
expertise.'
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, a floor approach already
seems to be in effect in some areas of private international law. As
Julian Ku has illustrated, the states have been instrumental in
implementing the United States' private law treaty obligations.'79 He
notes, "In many cases, states will work to enact state-level legislation
that implements private international law treaty obligations alongside
173. 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008).
174. See generally Somin, supra note 152.
175. 128 S. Ct. at 1041-45.
176. Id. at 1047.
177. Id at 1080-41.
178. Notably, the two dissenting justices argued that remedies for federal constitutional
violations must be standardized because the Constitution requires "uifbtmty of decisions
[on federal constitutional questions] throughout the whole United States." Id. at 1053
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48
(1816)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Julian G. Ku, The Crucial Role of the States and Pnvate Internatronal Law
Tfrates: A Model forAccommodating Globalizaon, 73 Mo. L. REv. 1063, 1064 (2008).
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federal implementing legislation.""'8 Ku offers the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction as an example.'8'
It was implemented by the federal International Child Abduction
Remedies Act (ICARA), but "a number of states have still adopted the
Uniform Child Custody and Enforcement Act so that state law can
enforce an order for the return of the child without reference to federal
law."' 2 Ku explains that "these seemingly redundant laws ensure that
private international law treaty obligations will be carried out at the
level of government that most commonly deals with such matters."'' 3
Thus, diversity in implementation does not necessarily mean
chaos or noncompliance. Rather, correctly structured, it can be
empowering, legitimizing, and educating." The floor model of VCCR
enforcement could permit a similarly structured and effective
interaction in the context of human rights treaty implementation.
IV EXTENDING THE MODEL
Federalism has thus far presented a barrier to compliance with the
VCCR. However, in human rights treaty implementation, as in other
areas of law, this need not necessarily be the case. A model of treaty
interpretation that explicitly carves out space for state participation
while maintaining a minimum floor of federal oversight could help to
move past the current impasse in implementing article 36 and meeting
the United States' international obligations. This solution could be
equally applicable-and perhaps even more significant-outside of
the context of the VCCR.
Four of the major international human rights treaties were
adopted with a "federalism" clause, which purports to leave
implementation of treaty rights to the states in those areas that
historically have been under state control.' 5 The "federalism" clause
attached to the ICCPR, for example, explains:
180. Id
181. Id. at 1065.
182. Id. Ku also identifies the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of
Legalization for Foreign Public Documents, as one that has been translated into state law
either through the adoption of the Uniform Law on Notarial Acts or through separate
legislation. Id.
183. Id
184. See genemlly Erwin Chemerinsky, Empoweing States When It Matters: A
DifferentApproach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004).
185. Henkin, supra note 36, at 341-46. Professor Henkin explains:
The "federalism" clause attached to U.S. ratifications of human rights
conventions has been denominated an "understanding," a designation ordinarily
used for an interpretation or clarification of a possibly ambiguous provision in the
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[T]he United States understands that this Covenant shall be
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises
legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and
otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent that state
and local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the
Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal
system to the end that the competent authorities of the state or local
governments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the
Covenant."6
As a matter of international treaty law, this reservation creates no legal
barriers to the acceptance of implementation of a treaty:
International law requires the United States to carry out its treaty
obligations but, in the absence of special provision, does not prescribe
how, or through which agencies, they shall be carried out.... [T]he
United States [therefore can] leave the implementation of any treaty
provision to the states [while] remain[ing] internationally responsible
for any failure of implementation.'
The presence of the federalism understanding in international human
rights treaties ratified by the United States simply means that "[i]f
treaty. The federalism clause in the instruments of ratification of the human fights
conventions is not an understanding in that sense, but may be intended to alert
other parties to United States intent in the matter of implementation.
Id. at 345.
The United States has taken some action on seven major United Nations human rights
treaties: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [the Genocide
Convention]; the International Convention on the Elimination on all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [CERD]; the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [ICESCR]; ICCPR, supra note 4; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
[CEDAW]; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1456 U.N.T.S. 85 [CAT]; and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.TS. 3 [CRC]. Three of the seven treaties-the
ICESCR, CRC, and CEDAW---have been signed but not ratified. See Curtis A. Bradley,
Unratifled Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the US. Constitution, 48 HARv. INT'L L.J. 307, 309
(2007). The other four-the Genocide Convention, CERD, the ICCPR, and the Convention
Against Torture-have been signed and ratified with a package of reservations,
understandings, and declarations. See Connie de la Vega, Human Rights and Trade."
Inconsistent Application of Treaty Law in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
Arr. 1, 12-13 (2004). Two of the four-the Genocide Convention and CAT-have been at
least partially incorporated into domestic federal law through implementing legislation. See
Lucien I. Dhooge, A Modest Proposal To Amend the Alien Tort Statute To Provide Guidance
to Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. DAViS J. INT'L L. & PoeY 119, 149-50 (2007); Linda
M. Keller, Is Truth Serum Torture? 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 521, 546-48 (2005).
186. 138 CONG. REc. S4781, S4784 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
187. Henkin, supra note 36, at 346.
1060
2010] HUMAN RIGHTS TREA TYIMPLEMENTA TION 1061
states fail to implement international treaty provisions that address
areas traditionally reserved to them, the United States cannot, as a
practical matter, achieve compliance with the treaty provisions to
which it is party."'88  Thus, the federalism reservations appear to
anticipate the active participation of state institutions in implementing
treaty mandates.
In practice, the federalism understanding has been viewed
primarily as working to limit the incorporation of human rights treaties
in U.S. domestic law because it purports to obviate the need for federal
action to implement the treaty in areas traditionally reserved to the
states. The United States has taken this position when reporting on its
treaty compliance. In its first report to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee regarding ICCPR compliance, the U.S. government
explained that it was
a government of limited authority and responsibility... [and that] state
and local governments exercise significant responsibilities in many
areas, including matters such as education, public health, business
organization, work conditions, marriage and divorce, the care of
children and exercise of the ordinary police power.... Some areas
covered by the Covenant fall into this category.
89
The report then went on to explain that by including a federalism
understanding at ratification,
the United States had ... put other governments worldwide on notice
that "the United States will implement its obligations under the
Covenant by appropriate legislative, executive and judicial means,
federal or state, and that the federal government will remove any federal
inhibition to the abilities of the constituent states to meet their
obligations in this regard?""
Nonetheless, the federalism understanding does not explicitly
attempt to excuse the United States from its treaty obligations; it
simply assigns state institutions some responsibility for implementing
them. However, despite the significant role envisioned for the states in
international human rights treaty implementation, there is little
evidence that the states view themselves as having a role in enforcing
ratified human rights treaties. The process of identifying state
188. Davis, supra note 9, at 362.
189. Id. at 364 (quoting United States, Initial Report of States Parties Due in 1993:
United States of America, delivered to the U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/8 l/Add. 4 (Aug. 24, 1994) (alteration in original)).
190. Id. at 364 (quoting United States, Initial Report of Papers Due in 1993: United
States of America, supra note 189, 4).
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initiatives to implement human rights treaties is challenging,
particularly given that the federal government has no initiative to track
state efforts to reach compliance. For example, the report of the
United States Human Rights Network's Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) Working Group on Local
Implementation and Treaty Obligations noted that the United States
has no federal or state body authorized to promote and monitor treaty
implementation, and the United States has done nothing to raise
awareness of CERD at the state or local level, despite the significant
role the states must play in implementing the VCCR's guarantees.'9
Similarly, "[T]he United States' 2006 Report on its compliance with
ICCPR provided 'only limited information ... on the implementation
of the Covenant at the state level."" 9  By rough measures, state activity
in this area is basically nonexistent. A survey of state human rights
commissions failed to show even a reference to implementing these
treaties as part of their mandates.'93 Moreover, a review of state court
decisions shows that references to the ratified international human
rights treaties that the United States has ratified are minimal.'94
One possible explanation for the absence of state level
implementation activity is state resistance to engaging with
international human rights treaty law. In this view, the federalism
understanding helps states and the federal government to collude in
avoiding their obligation to change domestic law when necessary to
191. Risa E. Kaufman, Book Review, Human Rights in the United States: Reclaiming
the History and Ensuring the Future, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 149, 159 (2008)
(reviewing BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2007)) (citing
United States Human Rights Network's CERD Working Groups on Local Implementation
and Treaty Obligations, A Report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination on U.S. CERD Obligations and Domestic Implementation (Feb. 2008),
available athttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/usa/USHRN7.doc).
192. Id. (quoting U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenan4 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1
(Dec. 18, 2006)); see U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Artcle 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations, United States of
America, 39, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18, 2006) (requesting additional
information on state actions towards treaty implementation).
193. As of 2008, "all but three states ha[d] a human rights or human relations
commission, and they operate in many cities and counties around the country, as well."
Kaufman, supra note 191, at 166. I reviewed the Web sites of the forty-seven state human
rights commissions and the District of Columbia and found no reference to the United States'
international obligations in the mission statements or the descriptions of these agencies,
notwithstanding the fact that "[tihese commissions may be an effective means of
implementing human rights treaty obligations and norms at the local level." Id.
194. As of July 23, 2009, a Westlaw search found only Ill cases referencing the
ICCPR and seventeen cases referencing the CERD. This absence can be explained in part by
the fact that these treaties were ratified with provisions rendering them non-self-executing.
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comply with the United States' international commitments. Certainly,
this reading of the situation would receive some support from the
reservation included with ratification of some of the international
human rights treaties that the United States' adherence to an
international human rights treaty should not effect-or promise-
change in existing law or practice.'95
However, it seems like that resistance to international law is not
the entire story. As numerous commentators have noted, some states
and localities have tried to encourage national acceptance of treaties
that have not been signed or ratified by adopting their provisions as
part of local law. For example, despite the United States' rejection of
the Kyoto Protocol, more than 800 mayors have endorsed it.'96
Additionally, despite the United States' continued failure to ratify the
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), "[b]y 2004, forty-four U.S. cities, eighteen
counties, and sixteen states had considered or passed legislation related
to CEDAW. Some jurisdictions have even gone so far as to implement
its provisions as a matter of local law."'197 Thus, to view the story as
entirely one of state resistance fails to recognize genuine differences
between the states with respect to these treaties. It seems clear that at
least some states and localities would engage with the process of
implementing ratified human rights treaties, particularly if they were
aware of their obligation to do so.
Therefore, the prevailing misconstruction of the federalism
understandings has resulted in a missed opportunity to engage the
states in the implementation of international human rights treaties.
When the United States ratifies treaties but makes reservations in the
name of federalism (that deference to states on the legality of a
particular practice is appropriate and necessary), the purpose is to
195. Henkin, supra note 36, at 342. The Senate ratified the ICCPR, which provides in
article 7 that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" ICCPR, supm note 4, art. 7, with the explicit reservation that this
phrase referred to "the cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." See, e.g.,
William A. Schabas, InvalidReservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Is the United States Still a Party., 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 281-82 (1995). The
validity of such reservations has been the subject of much discussion, particularly given that
as a matter of international law, nations may not attach reservations that are "incompatible
with the object and purpose of the agreement." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 313 (1986).
196. Ahdieh, supra note 8, at 1196.
197. Id
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preserve autonomy for states.'98 Properly understood, this presents a
directive to state authorities to pass implementing legislation that
enforces treaty rights and norms in those areas in which state law
controls and to design appropriate remedies for state violations of
these rights. If the federalism reservations were serving their intended
purpose, we might expect to see more engagement with ratified
international human rights treaties in state institutions. Presently,
however, we generally do not. Given the current structure of the
United States' participation in most international human rights treaties,
the United States cannot comply with its international obligations
absent state court participation.
Thus, the federalism understanding included in the ratified
treaties creates another opportunity similar to the VCCR cases for
implementing a dynamic federalist model for integrating international
human rights treaties into U.S. law. Adopting a "floor" model, state
institutions could take principal responsibility for interpreting and
implementing international human rights treaties, and remedying their
violation, subject only to limited review by the federal courts for
consistency with broad treaty standards. 9' For example, the ICCPR
commits the States parties to "have respect for the liberty of parents
... to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in
conformity with their own convictions."2 The State of Arizona, for
example, could decide to effectuate this right in part by creating a state
body to certify and support private home schooling organizations.
Were a religious parent dissatisfied with this program, she could
challenge it as insufficient under the treaty, and the decision by the
198. See generally Judith Resnik, Law Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent
Dialogues, and Federalism J Multiple Points ofEntry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).
199. As I suggested earlier, general implementing legislation might be more successful
than specific legislation in helping the United States reach compliance with its international
commitments, given that much can be lost in the ex ante translation of these broad texts. See
supra note 151 and accompanying text. For example, John Parry has demonstrated that the
statutes implementing the Convention Against Torture (CAT) take an approach that is "more
restrictive" than "the text of the Convention ... would support" reflecting the "more
restrictive view espoused during the ratification process." John T. Parry, Torture Nation,
Torture Law, 97 GEo. L.J. 1001, 1048-51 (2009). Federalism is far less of an impediment in
the context of CAT than in other human rights treaties, which perhaps is part of the
explanation why it, unlike the others, has been implemented through domestic legislation.
Nonetheless, the problem of translation is still apparent. Despite the fact that CAT was the
motivator behind these statutes, Parry still concludes that "international law is simply not a
very important source of U.S. legal doctrine with respect to torture and other forms of state
violence, even if it does provide a source for legal arguments and political advocacy." Id at
1051. I would like to thank Professor Karen Sokol for calling my attention to this issue in the
context of the CAT.
200. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 18.
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state or federal court would turn on whether Arizona's program was
sufficient to demonstrate that it met the broad treaty standard of
respecting parental liberty in controlling the religious education of
their child. Education is an area historically controlled by the states,
and the diversity of the states on a variety of parameters (number of
school age children, religiosity of population, diversity of religious
population, state educational resources, and population density, for
example) suggests that the question of how to accommodate religious
parents and their children in education might best be determined at the
local level.
Of course, given that the ICCPR, like many international human
rights treaties, was ratified with reservations rendering it non-self-
executing, Congress would have to pass general implementing
legislation in order to make the treaty enforceable in domestic courts,
and thus to permit the parent's lawsuit. Although I have proposed that
Congress might be more amenable to general implementing legislation
that leaves significant space for state autonomy in treaty implementa-
tion, the reality may be that the political will for any implementing
legislation is lacking."' However, even without further congressional
action, the federalism reservation means that the states (including
Arizona in the example) have the obligation to consider the ICCPR
and ensure that state law complies with its mandates. Thus, even the
process of articulating a proactive role for the states and encouraging
their participation in implementing these treaties (similar to that which
the State Department has undertaken with respect to the VCCR) could
stimulate increased state engagement and dialogue with these
treaties. °2 In particular, a better understanding of the states' mandate
in treaty implementation could empower the grassroots advocates who
have been responsible for most of the successes in promoting state and
local treaty compliance. 3 This would certainly not solve the problem
of state noncompliance-and is far weaker than Justice Breyer's
"floor" strategy.204  Nonetheless, increased state engagement with
treaty rights, even if patchy, could help bring states into the
201. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
202. Janet Koven Levit has argued persuasively that despite the failure of the Medellin
Court to articulate a role for the courts in remedying VCCR violations, a decade of VCCR
litigation has resulted in significantly increased levels of treaty compliance due to diligent
efforts by a variety of nonjudicial players. Levit, supra note 126, at 618.
203. See generally Martha F. Davis, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: States,
Municipalities, and International Human Rights, in 2 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME 127
(Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008).
204. Id
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implementation dialogue, and thus begin to minimize federalism as a
barrier to more national engagement.
V CONCLUSION
A dynamic federalist approach will not, by itself, resolve the
problem of American noncompliance with its international human
rights treaty obligations. My more modest goal is to suggest that,
under current law, treaty implementation is necessarily an interjuris-
dictional project, and there are benefits, both normative and pragmatic,
which could be realized from acknowledging and supporting it as
such. Pragmatically, increased participation of the states could help
minimize federalism as a barrier to international human rights treaty
compliance. Normatively, the decentralization of treaty implementa-
tion, in areas historically controlled by the states, could permit the
United States to realize the benefits of federalism, plurality, dialogue,
and redundancy in the treaty context.
Moreover, the major objection to state participation-that it
undermines the nation's ability to speak authoritatively with one
voice-fails to acknowledge that the United States is already speaking
with a plurality of voices at the international level, by action and
inaction, and in ways that are both rights-enhancing and rights-
reducing. Both Texas Governor Perry's decision not to stay Medellin's
execution and San Francisco's adoption of CEDAW resonate
internationally. They, along with myriad other federal, state, and local
actions, currently constitute the way that the United States responds to
its treaty obligations. Thus, the decentralized dynamic federalist
approach that I suggest does not actually create new voices. Rather,
this approach acknowledges and coordinates those who are already
speaking with the goal of moving towards a more integrated and
inclusive model of treaty implementation. Powell suggests that the
"core dilemma confronting the human rights project [is] how to square
the idea of universal international standards with the tendency toward
localism and particularity."20 5 A dynamic federalist approach captures
both of these aspirations by creating the space and the mandate for
localized understandings of universal commitments.
205. Powell, supranote 14, at 253.
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